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Ⅰ．Introduction
 The tribute system had played an essential role in the regional order of 
pre-colonial East Asia, a state system stretching from Korea and Japan in the 
northeast to Burma, Siam and Java in the southwest. This order is commonly 
regarded as a China-dominated regional hierarchy ?Fairbank, ????; Mancall, 
????; Kang, ????a?. One of its key features is that international relations in 
pre-colonial East Asia had not followed the logic of balance-of-power because 
??t?here is ... no evidence of external balancing or other coordinated efforts to 
constrain China? Wohlforth et al., ????: ???; see also Kaufman et al., ?????. 
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Abstract
 Southeast Asia had long been an integral part of the China-centered tribute 
system in the pre-colonial era. Yet, the hierarchical relationship between China and 
Southeast Asia has not been studied from the angle of international relations. This article 
contributes to the literature by looking into the strategic responses of Southeast Asian 
countries to the China-dominated regional hierarchy. It argues that international relations 
in pre-colonial Southeast Asia were characterized by a complex political structure of 
anarchy-within-hierarchy. In such a structural context, Southeast Asian countries often 
sought close tributary relations with China in order to survive and dominate the sub-
regional order. The tribute system was also instrumental in bringing about balancing 
behavior at the sub-regional level. Detailed analysis reveals that the tribute system offered 
three mechanisms crucial to the power balance of pre-colonial Southeast Asia: imperial 
recognition, tributary trade, and external arbitration and protection. 
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Instead, the hierarchical regional order relied on the cultural prominence of 
Confucianism, the disparity in economic and military strength, and the long-
standing influences of the tribute system, all of which favored the centrality of 
China ?Kang, ?????. 
 This article does not dispute the view that there was a lack of systemic 
balancing against China in pre-colonial East Asia. However, it shows that 
there was plenty of inter-state balancing among then the small and medium-
size countries in Southeast Asia. Though the logic of balance-of-power was 
not immediately obvious at the regional level, it had played a crucial part in the 
sub-regional system of pre-colonial Southeast Asia. The centuries-old conflicts 
between Dai Viet and Champa, between Burma and Ayutthaya/Siam, and 
among various Sumatra and Javanese kingdoms all point to the importance 
of power balancing. Notably, the dynamics of sub-regional balancing was not 
isolated from the power structure of East Asia. Upon close examination, the 
article argues that the hierarchical regional order dominated by China and 
embedded in the tribute system was in many ways instrumental in bringing 
about balancing behavior in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. 
 More specifically, the Sino-centric tribute system had provided three key 
mechanisms linking Southeast Asia and China in the pre-colonial regional 
order. Firstly, the imperial recognition by China was vital for Southeast Asian 
leaders to acquire political legitimacy in a hierarchical regional order. Secondly, 
the China-centered tributary trade was essential to meet the commercial 
interests of Southeast Asian trading states. Thirdly, Southeast Asian countries 
were not shy of seeking China?s arbitration and protection in their inter-state 
disputes. These three mechanisms, the article shows, had played a crucial part 
facilitating and regulating the sub-regional balance of pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia. 
 Recognizing that balancing remained relevant at a sub-regional level 
of hierarchical East Asia is important in both theoretical and policy terms. 
Theoretically, it provides empirical evidence for a possible synthesis of two 
contrasting theoretical approaches in the realist tradition: the balance of power 
and the hierarchical relations?. Instead of regarding the two as competing 
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explanations of universal relevance ?Wohlforth et al., ????; Kaufman et al., 
?????, it appears more useful to consider their interactive dynamics in a state 
system. In policy terms, the findings of the article indicate that the lack of 
systemic balancing and the abundance of sub-system balancing may coexist in 
a hierarchical system. This helps to explain, for example, the puzzles of post-
Cold War international order where the US hegemony met with few direct 
challenges while the world has not been free from small-scale power balancing 
at the regional level ?see Ikenberry, ????; Paul et al., ?????. 
 The remaining of the article is organized in the following way. The 
next section traces the theoretical arguments about balancing and hierarchy in 
international relations. The discussion leads to a possible synthesis of the two 
theoretical approaches to account for complex political structure. In the third 
section, the China-dominated tribute system and the Mandala-like Southeast 
Asian states are analyzed. It shows that international relations in pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia were characterized by a complex structure of ?anarchy within 
hierarchy?. The fourth section examines three mechanisms of the tribute system 
that were crucial to the power balance of Southeast Asia: imperial recognition, 
tributary trade, and external arbitration and protection. The final section 
summarizes the main findings and discusses the implications of the study.
Ⅱ ．Balance of Power and Hierarchical Relations in 
Structural Theories
 Hierarchy is one of the key concepts that Kenneth Waltz employs to 
examine the balance-of-power theory ?Waltz, ????: Ch??. In his structural 
realist framework, hierarchy stands on the opposite side of anarchy. Whereas 
anarchy is an international structure in which the units ?i.e., states? are similar 
and independent, hierarchy denotes a contrasting situation where the units 
are not just differentiated but closely interdependent. The differentiated inter-
state relations may take several forms from a highly hierarchical extreme to 
complete anarchy. According to Lake ?????: ????, hierarchical political 
relationships vary from imperium, dominion, mandate, to universal covenant 
?i.e., treaty between sovereign states?; hierarchical economic relationships 
range from economic union, dependency, economic zone, to non-hierarchical 
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market exchange; and hierarchical security relationships may appear as empire, 
informal empire, protectorate, sphere of influence, or alliance under anarchy. It 
is concerning the dynamics of alliance and balancing in an anarchic system that 
the theory of balance-of-power has most explanatory power. 
 The balance-of-power theory has two basic assumptions. First, individual 
states find themselves in an undifferentiated anarchic world where they can rely 
only on self-help. Second, states are ?unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek 
their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination? 
?Waltz, ????: ????. In order to survive under such an anarchic order, states 
have to guard constantly against aggressive peers and check the rise of potential 
hegemon. They may resort to self-strengthening measures such as economic 
development and military build-up ?i.e., internal balancing?, to alliance 
formation strategies by aligning with friendly states and staying away from 
antagonist ones ?i.e., external balancing?, and to active learning through the 
adoption of other states? successful practice ?i.e., emulation? Wohlforth et al., 
????: ???; see also Little, ?????. In the end, balancing behavior is expected 
to result in the formation of balances of power in the anarchic world. The 
strongest state in the system always faces systemic balancing by its weak peers. 
 In contrast to the theoretical assumptions of balance-of-power, 
hierarchical relations recognize the structural inequality of international order. 
The inequality is reflected in the relationship among, say, the dominant power, 
great powers, and medium and small powers ?Organski, ????; Clark, ?????. It 
also appears in the interaction between the hegemonic superpower and the rest 
of the world ?Gilpin, ?????. It may even take the form of relational contracts 
that the dominant state enters into with subordinate ones ?Lake, ????; see also 
Krasner, ????; Keene, ?????. Despite the structural difference, states still strive 
for survival and domination under the hierarchical order. However, the optimal 
strategy for weak states shifts from balancing to bandwagoning ?Waltz, ????; 
Walt, ????; Kang, ????b?. That is, they are more likely to align with strong 
states. By recognizing their lower status in the hierarchical system, weak states 
may benefit from their close relationship with the powerful ?Schweller, ?????. 
Such benefits include opener international trade, active security protection by 
the dominant state?, and easier resolution of disagreement with third parties. 
231
Waseda Global Forum No. ?, ????, ???????
As David Lake points out, subordinate states ?can prosper internationally under 
authoritative orders? Lake, ????: ????. Under these circumstances, there 
should be very few, if not none, revisionist challengers against the dominant 
state in a hierarchical system.  
 With their theoretical predictions in sharp contrast, the theories of 
balance-of-power and hierarchical relations appear competing with each other. 
Indeed, the recent attempt to test the balance-of-power theory against the non-
European context is based on such an understanding ?Wohlforth et al., ????; 
Kaufman et al., ?????. However, as the above discussion shows, the theories of 
balance-of-power and hierarchical relations make different assumptions about 
the structures of world politics: anarchy vs. hierarchy; describe contrasting 
behavior patterns of weak states: balancing vs. bandwagoning; and lead to 
opposite predictions about international relations: systemic balancing vs. 
hierarchy-based alignment. If the two theoretical approaches share anything, it 
is the structural realist presumptions that states seek survival and domination, 
and that state behavior is influenced by the structure of world politics ?Clark, 
?????. Because the balance of power and the hierarchical relations each focus 
on the impact of different international political structure one may reasonably 
doubt whether the two are competing theories at all.? 
 This, then, opens the possibility of juxtaposing the theories of balance-
of-power and hierarchical relations to understand the impacts of complex 
structure in world politics. Yet, can anarchy and hierarchy coexist within the 
same international system ? In the original Waltzian framework, anarchy and 
hierarchy are two logically opposite concepts, the former being a realm of 
politics and power and the latter the realm of authority and administration 
?Waltz, ????: ????. Though the view that anarchy and hierarchy are mutually 
exclusive is now rejected, scholars still use the notion of ?degrees of hierarchy? 
along a single-dimensional continuum between total anarchy and complete 
hierarchy to identify different forms of hierarchical relations ?see Milner, ????; 
Watson, ????; Lake, ????; Kang, ????b?. In such a framework, anarchy and 
hierarchy remains incompatible with each other. 
 The theoretical rigidity forces scholars to develop new concepts to explain 
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the analytical anomalies in international relations. In his update of the Waltzian 
balance of power, Walt ?????? argues that balance of threat is better equipped 
to explain ?the lack of? balancing behavior in world politics. In contrast to 
Waltz?s view that balancing is always targeted at a perspective hegemon, he 
claims that states are more likely to balance against their imminent security 
threats which may not originate from the most powerful. In the absence of 
perceived ?offensive intentions?, small and medium-size states may well choose 
to bandwagon with, rather than balance against, the powerful one. This, for 
instance, explains the ?abnormal? alliance pattern during the Cold War that 
western European countries aligned with the most powerful state? the US?
under the security framework of NATO, because they faced more imminent 
security threats from the USSR and its allies in eastern Europe ?Walt, ????: 
???-????. 
 Focusing on the eastern side of the Cold War confrontation, Wendt and 
Friedheim ?????? use the concept of ?informal empire? to analyze the USSR-
East Germany relations. Within this bilateral relationship, the authors argue 
that there was a tension between the juridical equality of territorial sovereignty 
and the de facto inequality regarding the distribution of ?military? power. The 
former constitutes ?the states system as an anarchy?, and the latter produces ?a 
genuine hierarchy in the system? ???-????. Rather than treating anarchy and 
hierarchy as the two extremes of a single-dimensional continuum, Wendt and 
Friedheim consider the relationship as ?hierarchy under anarchy?. Their article 
claims that the tension between hierarchy and anarchy has characterized the 
USSR-East Germany relations throughout the Cold War. Though the study 
adopts a constructivist perspective, the conceptualization of informal empire as 
a ?hierarchy under anarchy? is worth further discussion. 
 From a structuralist point of view, the Cold War was essentially a bipolar 
anarchy. It was anarchy at the global level because there was no world authority 
capable of regulating the inter-state relations. Indeed, the confrontation 
between the East and the West has several times brought the world on the 
brink of war. Meanwhile, there were two parallel hierarchies because the US 
and the USSR were the superpowers in the system. Each claimed special 
authority over other states belonging to the same ideological camp. Taking both 
233
Waseda Global Forum No. ?, ????, ???????
aspects together, one may ascertain both a system-level structure and a sub-
system-level structure of Cold War politics. At the system-level, states were 
formally recognized as the same independent and sovereign entities; at the sub-
system level, the states within the same camp were economically, politically 
and militarily interdependent. In this analytical framework, the Cold War was 
characterized by a complex structure of system-level anarchy and sub-system-
level hierarchy. 
 In a world where anarchy and hierarchy coexist, balance-of-power and 
hierarchical relations each offer a valuable approach to explore the structural 
impacts of world politics. To account for the alliance of the US and western 
Europe in the West, Walt ?????? applies the balance-of-threat theory 
and argues that western European countries balanced against the security 
threats originated from the anarchic, not the hierarchical, part of the system. 
By comparison, Wendt and Friedheim ?????? look into the hierarchical 
dimension of USSR-East Germany relations in the East. Their research 
highlights the tension between juridical equality and de facto inequality in a 
?hierarchy under anarchy? system. The two studies highlight different aspects 
of the anarchy-hierarchy structure. However, the conceptualization of balance-
of-threat and hierarchy-under-anarchy allows the researchers to grasp the dual 
structural feature of the Cold War. 
 To understand a complex political structure like the Cold War, a more 
fruitful analytical approach may combine the theories of balance-of-power and 
hierarchical relations together. Anarchy and hierarchy are conceptualized as two 
logically opposite structures of international relations. Nevertheless, anarchy 
and hierarchy may coexist at different levels of world politics, or characterize 
different domains of international affairs ?e.g., in dealing with climate change 
and terrorism?. Under these circumstances, what at stake is not whether states 
balance or bandwagon, but the seemingly irrational strategies that states adopt 
in a ?nested game? of complex political structure ?see Tsebelis, ?????. After 
all, states not just choose between balancing and bandwagoning. They also 
opt for engagement, hedging, buckpassing, containment, neutrality and non-
alignment in the real world. Neither the balance of power nor the hierarchical 
relations alone provides a satisfactory explanation for these empirical anomalies. 
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A more promising approach in the realist tradition should use the combined 
explanatory power of balance-of-power and hierarchical relations in theoretical 
modeling. 
 The international relations of pre-colonial Southeast Asia offer a good 
case in point. Under a hierarchical tributary order, Southeast Asia had been 
subordinate to the imperial influences of China for several centuries. Indeed, 
most Southeast Asian countries chose to comply with the regional hierarchy, 
rather than challenge it ?Reid, ?????. Focusing only on the hierarchical 
relations, Kang ?????b, ????? argues that the China-centered tribute system 
had contributed to the regional stability in pre-colonial East Asia. This account 
overlooks the fact that Southeast Asia, an integral part of the tribute system, 
was dominated by the inter-state competition for survival and domination 
throughout the pre-colonial era ?Lieberman, ?????. Yet, the theory of balance-
of-power is not able to decode the complexity of pre-colonial relationship 
between Southeast Asia and China, either. In sharp contrast to the theoretical 
prediction, the balance-of-power politics of pre-colonial Southeast Asia had 
never challenged the predominance of China ?Wohlforth et al., ?????. It was 
instead played out under the auspices of the hierarchical tribute system. Such 
structural complexity can only be accounted for by a combined theoretical 
perspective of balance-of-power and hierarchical relations. 
 Two related questions are of importance here. First, how did regional 
hierarchy and sub-regional anarchy evolve into a viable political structure 
between China and Southeast Asia ? Second, what were the structural impacts 
of China?s supremacy on the dynamics of power balance in pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia ? The rest of the article addresses these two issues in turn. 
Ⅲ ．Structuring Anarchy within Hierarchy: The Tribute 
System and the Mandalas
 China had for centuries stood at the center of the regional hierarchy 
in pre-colonial East Asia, a multi-state system that was eventually brought 
to an end by the Europeans around the mid-??th century ?Fairbank, ????; 
Mancall, ?????. There were times when China appeared less than a regional 
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hegemon because of dynastic changes and internal division? ?Rossabi, ?????. 
Nonetheless, East Asia for most of the time had been culturally, economically, 
and militarily dominated by a single country ?Kang, ?????. At the heart of the 
hierarchical inter-state relations was the long-standing tribute system of China. 
１．The Tribute System and the Regional Hierarchy
 Generally speaking, the tribute system fulfilled three main functions 
that were essential to China?s central position in the regional hierarchy. First, 
it created a set of sophisticated rules to regulate how the foreign missions 
performed the tributary rituals ?Fairbank, ????; Mancall, ????; Stuart-Fox, 
?????. Though the details varied from time to time, receiving a tributary 
mission normally involved the following procedures. The tributary mission was 
first welcomed at a designated border or coastal city. From this point onwards 
only a limited number ?of people, animals and ships? were allowed to travel 
to the capital. Transportation and postal services were provided to facilitate the 
trip. In the capital, the mission stayed at the Official Residence for Tributary 
Envoys. Its members were paid allowances drawn from the Chinese treasury 
for the period of their stay. In the court, the tributary ruler ?via his/her envoys? 
received an imperial patent of appointment, together with a noble rank and 
an imperial seal. All these were dated according to the Chinese dynastic 
calendar. Then, members of the mission were entertained at the banquets with 
the presence of the emperor. On this occasion the envoys performed the so-
called kowtow?, and then received tea and gifts from the emperor. The tributary 
mission?s return trip was accompanied by a ceremonial usher, who escorted the 
mission back to the border. 
 The tributary rituals, performed usually on the important days such as 
the New Year or the birthday of the emperor, aimed at a large domestic and 
foreign audience to show not only the superior status of China in relations 
to tributary countries but also the virtue of the emperor and his/her personal 
prestige. Despite the symbolic significance of tributary rituals, the tribute 
was not supposed to be a burden on the tributary countries. As Fairbank 
?????: ???? notes, ?the value of the tribute objects was ... balanced, if not 
out-weighed, by the imperial gifts.? Of more importance to China was the 
extent to which tributary countries respected the Chinese civilization. Indeed, 
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tributary countries were ranked by China according to this standard, creating a 
regional hierarchy based on the perceived Chinese-ness rather than the actual 
power or strengthen ?Kang, ????: ???. For instance, Korea and Vietnam were 
ranked higher than Japan because of their closer adoption of Chinese practices. 
The rules of tributary rituals directly reflected such a ranking. Highly ranked 
tributary countries not just enjoyed more elaborated rituals in the Chinese 
capital, but were rewarded with higher noble ranks and better imperial seals by 
the emperor. They were also allowed more frequent tributes, a privilege some 
Southeast Asian countries once fiercely competed for. Considering that the 
ceremonies for foreign missions were organized around the same days, such 
artificially ranked status was of considerable significance in a China-dominated 
regional hierarchy. 
 Second, the tribute system offered a two-way diplomatic channel between 
China and tributary countries. The foreign relations of traditional China were 
conducted almost entirely within the tributary framework ?Fairbank, ????; 
Mancall, ?????. From time to time China sent its own envoys to foreign 
countries. These China-initiated diplomatic missions were tributary in nature 
because most were tasked with the imperial communication that encouraged 
a foreign country to send tribute to China.? This usually occurred at the 
beginning of a new dynasty in China. Historical records show that, soon after 
he defeated the Mongols and reunited China in ????, the first Ming emperor 
sent his envoys on the same day to Korea and Dai Viet ?in today?s northern 
Vietnam? to inform them of his victory and the birth of the new dynasty; one 
month later, similar missions were dispatched to Japan, Champa ?in today?s 
southern Vietnam?, and Java ?Ming Shi Lu, ?????. Notably, even before the 
Ming envoy reached the destination, a tributary mission from Champa had 
arrived at Nanjing to congratulate the new dynasty ?Wang, ????: ????. When 
the famous expeditions of Zheng He was sent abroad, the missions brought 
imperial appoints and seals with them in order to convince foreign rulers to 
take part in the tribute system. Such imperial communication was considered 
so important that after the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming in the mid-??th 
century, tributary states were explicitly required to ?send back the imperial seal 
granted ?to? them in the Ming period? Fairbank and Teng, ????: ????. 
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 Third, the tribute system allowed the bilateral trade between China and 
tributary countries to be conducted at the official level. Before the colonial trade 
of staple goods dominated the world, international trade focused mostly on 
luxury goods since only a very high profit margin could compensate for the risks 
associated with trade. Then, China was both a major producer of luxury goods 
such as silk and porcelain and a crucial market for luxuries and precious metals. 
There were two ways that a foreign country conducted trade with China: 
tributary trade and private trade. During the Song dynasty, tributary and private 
trades were both allowed. Private trade generated substantial tax revenues 
for the imperial court, but the official tributes to China came to a minimum 
?Shiba, ?????. When private trade was banned in the Ming and the early Qing 
dynasties, tributary trade flourished as a result. It is therefore not surprising that 
the tribute system is considered by some as ?a cloak for trade? Fairbank, ????, 
????; Wang, ????; Stuart-Fox, ?????. The tributary missions usually included 
merchants, who effectively monopolized the tributary trade with China. These 
merchants were allowed to trade at the designated market in the border or 
coastal city where the mission was first received. Alternatively, they could bring 
their goods to the special market set up next to the Official Residence for 
Tributary Envoys in the capital of China. Though trade outside these markets 
was strictly forbidden, tributary trade was free of duty?an attractive bounty of 
the tribute system that many trading states found difficult to resist. 
 In short, the tribute system with its elaborated tributary rituals, two-way 
diplomatic communication and profitable tributary trade had created a China-
dominated regional hierarchy in East Asia. Nevertheless, the system provided 
China with surprisingly few means to interfere with the internal affairs of 
tributary countries. As long as the tributary rulers agreed to an inferior status, 
they were mostly ?free to pursue domestic affairs and ?conduct? diplomacy 
with one another as they saw fit? Kang, ????: ????. Standing at the top of the 
regional hierarchy, China was consciously self-restrained to limit the potentially 
negative impacts of its superiority. The self-restraint by China, paradoxically, 
allowed the formation of a complex political structure of ?anarchy within 
hierarchy? in Southeast Asia.
238
Min SHU? Balancing in a Hierarchical System: Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia and the Tribute 
System
２．The Mandalas and Sub-Regional Anarchy
 In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, sub-regional anarchy was a direct 
consequence of the distinctive political structure that characterized many pre-
modern Southeast Asian states? the Mandalas. The Mandalas refer to the 
political structure of concentric circles of power that a central authority claims 
over its territory, where the influences of the authority wane as it moves away 
from the center ?Wolters, ????; Stuart-Fox, ?????. As the basic form of pre-
modern states, the Mandalas had dominated the political scene of Southeast 
Asia until they were finally displaced in the ??th century ?Frederick, ?????. 
There is an inherent tension within the political structure of the Mandalas. In 
rhetoric, the king of each Mandala claimed universal authority over the local 
rulers as if they were obedient allies and vassals. In practice, the Mandalas 
represented an ?unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical 
area without fixed boundaries and where smaller centers ?and their local rulers? 
tended to look in all directions for security? Wolters, ????: ??-???. Adding to 
the internal uncertainty is the fact that ?Mandalas would expand and contract 
in concertina-like fashion. Each one contained several tributary rulers, some 
of whom would repudiate their vassal status when the opportunity arose and 
try to build up their own networks of vassals? ???. For pre-modern Southeast 
Asian states, the fluid and often overlapping claims of the Mandalas generated 
intensified security problems from both within and without. 
 The recurring inter-state conflicts in pre-colonial Southeast Asia offer 
some vivid examples of such intensified security problems. The political history 
of Southeast Asia is usually divided into two phrases: the rise of early kingdoms 
between the ?th and ??th century, and the consolidation of pre-modern states 
from the ??th century to the late ??th and early ??th century ?Bentley, ????; 
Lieberman, ????, ????; SarDesai, ?????. In the earlier phrase, mainland 
Southeast Asia was occupied by Dai Viet and Champa in the east, the Khmer 
Empire of Angkor in the middle, and the Burmese-Mon Kingdom of Pagan 
in the west. Around the same time, maritime Southeast Asia was dominated 
by the trading state of Srivijaya in Sumatra and the mostly agriculture-based 
Javanese Kingdoms of Sailendra, Mataram and Kediri. These earlier Southeast 
Asian kingdoms virtually all adopted the organizational principles of the 
Mandalas. For instance, the Khmer Empire of Angkor was characterized by 
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?a pluralistic society permeated by crosscutting patronage ties? Bentley, ????: 
????. There were often multiple claims to the throne. The royal controls 
weakened as it moved further away from the capital. The maritime power of 
Srivijaya was no less Mandala-like. Once monopolizing the trade routes of the 
Malacca Strait, Srivijaya was a powerful trading state claiming authority over 
much of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and West Java ?Wolters, ????, ?????. 
Nevertheless, study shows that there was a lack of ?centralized administration? 
in Srivijaya ?Wicks, ?????. During its reign, Srivijaya had moved its capital 
several times because successive rulers formed close alliances with different 
neighbors. The internal instability of early Southeast Asian Kingdoms coincided 
with intensified inter-state conflicts. In the mainland, Dai Viet battled with 
Champa in the east; the Khmer Empire was split into Upper Chenla in the 
north and Lower Chenla in the south, and was ultimately weakened by internal 
division ?Lieberman, ????; SarDesai, ?????. In the Indonesian archipelago, 
Srivijaya competed with successive Javanese Kingdoms for almost five centuries, 
especially during the periods when the latter developed special interests in 
maritime trade ?Wolters, ????, ????; Lieberman, ?????. 
 The early phrase of political development was abruptly interrupted by 
the Mongol invasion in the ??th century. Within a period of less than four 
decades, Mongol troops were dispatched to Dai Viet in ????, ???? and ????, 
to Champa in ????, to the Burmese-Mon Kingdom of Pagan in ???? and 
????, and to Java in ???? Stuart-Fox, ????: Ch??. These military expeditions 
ended only in short-term victories. By the end of the ??th century, Mongol 
troops were mostly pushed out of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the Mongol 
invasion fatally weakened some powerful early kingdoms, and opened up 
crucial space for the rise of new states. Adding to the political changes were the 
growing influence of new religions?Theravada Buddhism and Islam, both of 
which were set to replace Hinduism in Southeast Asia ?Coedes, ?????. 
 Not surprisingly, the second phrase of political history in Southeast 
Asia began with a period of widespread turmoil in the ??th century as newly 
established states struggled for survival and competed for domination on 
the ruins of old kingdoms ?Lieberman, ????: ???. In the central mainland, 
Tai kingdoms of Sukhothai, Lan Na, and Ayutthaya started to challenge the 
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authority of weakened Khmer Empire. Among them, Ayutthaya quickly rose to 
prominence partly because of the steady revenue from trade ?Wyatt, ?????. In 
the east mainland, Dai Viet and Champa both survived the Mongol invasion, 
so did their centuries-old antagonism. The power balance between the two was 
largely maintained until the Dai Viet?s campaign in ???? decisively defeated 
Champa. In the west mainland, the newly formed kingdoms of Ava, Pegu, 
Toungoo, and the Shan states battled against one another on the ruins of Pagan. 
It was not until the mid-??th century that Toungoo finally conquered the rest and 
unified the country. In maritime Southeast Asia, Majaphit established a powerful 
maritime empire. At its peak, the country controlled nearly the whole Indonesian 
archipelago. As Majaphit went into decline, the Muslim state of Melaka turned 
itself into the best Southeast Asian trading port in the ??th century. 
 Most of the newly established states still followed the Mandala model 
of concentric authority and ?semi-independent tributaries? Lieberman, ????: 
???. As powerful states competed for domination through their networks of 
tributary vassals, small countries strived to survive between powerful neighbors. 
For instance, the Tai state of Lan Na was a victim of the rivalry between 
Toungoo and Ayutthaya. It became a vassal of Toungoo after a war broke out 
between the two sides in ????. Yet, when the first Toungoo dynasty fell apart in 
???? the Toungoo prince who resided in Lan Na was forced to seek assistance 
from Ayutthaya. This created a bizarre situation that ?a Burmese prince ruling 
in Lan Na under Siam?s suzerainty?, a clear evidence of the anarchic order 
and intensified power struggles at the time ?Wyatt, ????: ????. By contrast, 
Melaka was skillful enough to maneuver between its powerful neighbors. Soon 
after it was established as a small trading city-state in the early ??th century, 
Melaka sent tribute to Ayutthaya and accepted its claim. Meanwhile, the 
Melakan rulers made considerable efforts to pursue close tributary relationship 
with China to counterbalance the influence of Ayutthaya ?SarDesai, ????: ???. 
Between ???? and ???? it dispatched ?? tributary missions to the Ming court, 
and the first three rulers of Melaka all visited China in person ?Wang, ????b?. 
 As Southeast Asian states continued to consolidate, the Mandala model 
of political governance went through some notable changes in the ??th century. 
By this time maritime Southeast Asia had already fallen under the controls 
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of the Europeans, but mainland Southeast Asia still followed its own political 
dynamics. In the central mainland, an Ayutthaya general, Taksin, managed to 
reclaim the country after a devastating Burmese invasion. He declared himself 
the king of Siam in ????. The successive campaigns of his troop unified Siam 
and Lan Na, solving a long-term security problem of the vassal state. In the 
west mainland, the Toungoo dynasty collapsed in ????. Its successor, the 
Konbaung dynasty, pursued a more rigorous state-building policy that brought 
Arakan, Manipur and Assam and the Shan states under its firm control around 
the end of ??th and the start of ??th century. In the east mainland, the remnant 
of Champa and the Mekong Delta were finally incorporated into soon-to-be-
unified Vietnam in the mid-??th century. Though the traditional Mandalas still 
characterized weak Khmer, Malay and Tai states till the ??th century, ?tighter 
tributary controls? had replaced ?semi-independent tributaries?, and became the 
key feature of consolidated Siam, Burma and Vietnam in mainland Southeast 
Asia ?Lieberman, ????: ???. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to assess the 
long-term impacts of consolidated states on the sub-regional conflicts in 
Southeast Asia. Soon these countries were to face major security challenges 
from the other side of the Eurasian Continent.  
 In short, notwithstanding the regional hierarchy formalized by elaborated 
tributary rituals and lucrative tributary trade, the relationship between China 
and its tributary states allowed ?considerable informal equality? Kang, ????: 
???. Behind the China-dominated regional hierarchy, one may identify fairly 
independent dynamics of international relations at the sub-regional level of 
Southeast Asia. As a result of the political configuration of the Mandalas, 
Southeast Asian countries faced more intensified security threats from their 
sub-regional neighbors than from China. These factors contributed to the 
distinctive political order in pre-colonial Southeast Asia: formal hierarchy at 
the regional level and de facto anarchy at the sub-regional level, the structural 
impacts of which are examined in the next section. 
Ⅳ ．Balance of Power under Hierarchy: the China Factor 
in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia
 China had always loomed large in the sub-regional affairs of pre-colonial 
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Southeast Asia because of its prominent status in the regional hierarchy. 
Nonetheless, the unusual impacts of China were not derived from the military 
strength it had. Except for the expeditions sent by the Mongols, large-scale 
military operation by China was rarely seen on the ground of Southeast Asia. 
Dai Viet was twice invaded by Ming and Qing troops in ???? and ???? Wang, 
????: ???-???; Reid, ????: ??; Stuart-Fox, ????: ????; the Konbaung dynasty 
of Myanmar was attacked by the Qing in the ????s ?Dai, ?????. Apart from 
the Mongol invasions, these were all the major military campaigns that China 
had ever launched against Southeast Asia between the ?th and ??th century ?Shu, 
?????. Notably, none of them ended in the long-term victory of China. 
 Compared with China?s lack of military ambitions, Southeast Asian 
countries were keen to be involved in the China-dominated regional hierarchy. 
Most paid tributes to China; some rulers even presented the tributes in person. 
It was not a small deal if one considers the transportation conditions of pre-
modern East Asia. Some indeed died on their way to China. This was the case 
when the King of Brunei took his family to pay homage to the Ming court 
in ???? ?Reid, ????: ??-???.? Then, what had made China so important to 
Southeast Asia ? In general, Southeast Asian countries were keen to seek the 
imperial influences of China under three specific conditions. First, when a 
dynastic change or royal succession took place, these countries usually sought 
China?s approval of the new ruler. Second, during the periods when private 
trade was banned, Southeast Asian trading states tried to establish close 
tributary trade relations with China. Third, when these countries were in 
conflict with neighboring states, they were inclined to invite China to arbitrate, 
and sometimes intervene, in their disputes. 
 Discussed in the last section, Southeast Asian countries faced the 
harsh reality of sub-regional anarchy in the pre-colonial era. Individual states 
constantly struggled for survival and domination. Royal succession, trade 
competition and inter-state conflicts were the crucial circumstances under 
which the fate of a country could be fundamentally redefined. Turning to a 
powerful ?outsider? for assistance and assurance was not inconceivable even if 
it required ceremonial subordination to the imperial court. As Reid ?????: 
???? points out, ?all Southeast Asian states recognized that China was larger 
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and stronger than themselves, and ... all were content to have letters of homage 
written in Chinese in their name.? The political influences that China had 
on Southeast Asia were very likely an outcome of the balancing strategies 
that Southeast Asian countries adopted in response to the complex political 
structure of sub-regional anarchy and regional hierarchy in the pre-colonial era. 
１．Balancing Strategy I: Seeking Imperial Recognition
 Royal succession and dynastic change were probably the most sensitive 
political issue in pre-colonial East Asia. Legitimate succession enhanced the 
authority of the newly installed ruler vis-à-vis his/her subjects. It also allowed 
the ruler to resume the responsibilities and privileges of his/her predecessor. By 
contrast, illegitimate succession weakened the new ruler?s authority. If the self-
claimed succession turned out to be a disguise of usurpation or even dynastic 
change, not only were the country?s foreign relations subject to re-definition, 
but also the norm of legitimate succession was left in limbo. Hence, both the 
new ruler and neighboring countries had strong interests in legitimizing the 
succession process. 
 In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, succession issues were complicated 
by the anarchy-within-hierarchy structure of international relations. At the 
sub-regional level, the Mandala-style polities were prone to the problem of 
illegitimate succession. The concentric circle of power structure often created 
a situation that several royal members or local rulers simultaneously claimed to 
the throne ?Stuart-Fox, ????: ???. The existence of antagonist neighboring 
states further exacerbated the problem. Meanwhile, China had adopted a set 
of very strict rules of legitimate succession, reflecting the deep influences of 
Confucian tradition. Legitimate succession was so important to China that it 
was willing to use force to punish the usurpers ?see Shu, ?????. Because of 
this, China?s recognition of the new regime could bring substantial legitimacy 
to the rulers in Southeast Asia.
 When Taksin, a provincial governor of Ayutthaya, reclaimed his country 
from the devastating invasion of Burma, he declared himself the King of 
Siam in ????. Immediately he sent his envoys to China for recognition. The 
Qing court replied that the new ruler should first try to find and install the 
244
Min SHU? Balancing in a Hierarchical System: Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia and the Tribute 
System
descendants of the older ruling house. Indeed, there was evidence that two 
Ayutthaya princes had fled the Burmese invasion and stayed in a settlement of 
Chinese emigrants on the western edge of the Mekong Delta. The settlement 
was stormed and conquered by Taksin forces in ????. During the process, 
the Qing authorities had sent at least three missions to investigate the matter. 
When it was concluded that no Ayutthaya descendant could be found, 
China recognized Taksin as ?lord of the country? Wills, ?????. Only after 
he decisively defeated the Burmese and built an even stronger country than 
Ayutthaya, was Taskin eventually recognized by the Qing court as ?King of 
Siam? in ???? Stuart-Fox, ????: ????. 
 Another complication occurred one year later when Taksin was disposed 
and imprisoned by his own general for alleged mental problems. The general, 
once an adopted son of Taksin?s family, claimed himself the legitimate successor 
to the throne. In his letter to the Qing court, he used the same Chinese 
surname as Taksin?s to report the ?death? of his father. The letter stated, Taksin 
on his deathbed ?exhorted me to rule with care, not to change the old order, to 
have care for our own sovereign land and to honor the Heavenly Dynasty? cf. 
Wills, ?????. The new King called himself Rama I, and started the Chakkri 
dynasty which remains the ruling royal family of Thailand today. The dynasty 
continued to use Taksin?s surname in its correspondence with China until the 
tribute system came to an end in the mid-??th century. 
 The recognition by China was of particular importance to small Southeast 
Asian states. An illegitimate small country was vulnerable to the intervention 
of neighboring powers. It might even be used as an excuse for the country?s 
inclusion in an expanding Mandala. Because of such risk, China?s recognition 
was considered as a vital counterbalance to aggressive neighbors. The grand 
expeditions of Zheng He between ???? and ???? strengthened such a view 
?Wang, ????: ???-????. On his fourth voyage, Zheng He sent his forces 
to restore a rightful ruler of Samudra, a small state on the northeast coast of 
Sumatra. The usurper was defeated and humiliated. He was then taken as a 
prisoner to China, together with his wife and child ?Stuart-Fox, ????: ???. 
On some other occasions, the submission of small Southeast Asian countries 
to China provoked their powerful neighbors. In ???? the son of a recently 
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died ruler of Jambi, then a vassal of the Majapahit Empire in central Sumatra, 
sought China?s recognition because he ?had not dared to succeed his father 
without imperial permission? Wolters, ????: ???. The powerful Javanese 
empire was so angry with the contact, that they diverted the Chinese envoys, 
who were due to grant Jambi investiture, to Java and killed them there in ???? 
?Wolters, ????: ????. 
２．Balancing Strategy II: Securing Tributary Trade
 To benefit from the highly profitable tributary trade was another major 
reason why many Southeast Asian countries paid tributes to China. Particularly 
during the periods when private trade was banned, the only way to get access 
to the products and the market of China was tributary trade. As Reid ?????: 
???? notes, ??i?f Chinese emperors tolerated international trade only as an 
aspect of diplomacy, with Southeast Asian rulers it was inclined to be the other 
way around.? However, trade diplomacy was only half of the story. In pre-
colonial Southeast Asia, the steady inflow of trade revenues not just brought the 
tributary states wealth but provided them with the crucial means to compete in 
an anarchic world. 
 Along the pre-colonial Southeast Asian trade routes, three areas had been 
able to thrive repeatedly on their trade with China. One of these was located 
in southern Vietnam. Until it was integrated into unified Vietnam in the early 
??th century, the area witnessed the rise and fall of Champa as well as the 
southern Vietnamese regimes known as Cochin-China. To the north, Champa 
was locked in the power struggle with Dai Viet for nearly five centuries. To the 
west, the country faced threat from the Khmer empire. Throughout its history, 
Champa had kept close tributary relations with China. Trade was undoubtedly 
an important factor behind this relationship. For example, between ??? and 
???? Champa sent ?? official trade missions to the Song court whereas Dai 
Viet only dispatched four such missions during the same period ?Wade, ????: 
????. Trade with China was so extensive that Song cashes became an integral 
part of Cham economy around the ??th and ??th century. In the end, however, 
trade was not enough to help the country survive the attack of Dai Viet in the 
??th century. Yet, the significance of trade further grew in the next one hundred 
years. Cochin-China became the base of southern Vietnamese regimes around 
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the second half of the ??th century. The continued importance of traditional 
trade routes allowed these regimes to collect a substantial amount of taxes from 
the shipping trade ?Reid, ????: ????. Between ???? and ???? seven wars 
were fought between the north and the south. All ended with Cochin-China?s 
victory over the numerically much larger armies of the north. In the ??th 
century trade revenues reached about one-third of the royal income ?Li, ?????. 
The inflow of trade revenues aided the Nguyen regime?s military campaigns 
against the north in the ????s and ????s, and probably contributed to the final 
unification of Vietnam in ???? Lieberman, ????: ???. 
 The southern coast of Thailand was another area that had traditionally 
benefited from trade with China. In the aftermath of destructive Mongol 
invasions, three Tai kingdoms?Ayutthaya, Sukhothai and Lan Na?
established themselves on the west edge of the weakened Khmer Empire. 
When it was founded in ????, Ayutthaya was only a small kingdom along 
the southern coast. The country was recognized as a trading state by China in 
????. In response, Ayutthaya dispatched ?? missions to the Ming court in the 
following six decades, more frequently than any other country in Southeast Asia 
?Reid, ????: ??-???. Private trade was banned in China during this period. 
The close tributary relations made Ayutthaya and its port an integral part 
of the Southeast Asian trade routes. Trade revenues quickly became a major 
source of loyal income ?Stuart-Fox, ????: ???. Soon the country expanded to 
the Malay Peninsula in the south, and made Sukhothai its vassal in the north 
by ????. Even after Ayutthaya was destroyed by the invasion of Konbaung 
Burma, the newly established Kingdom of Siam continued to rely on the China 
connection to prosper ?Lieberman, ????: ???. Regular tributes were sent to 
Beijing between ???? and ???? ?Fairbank and Teng, ????: ???-????. With 
the help of substantial trade revenues, Siam?s skillful rulers managed to turn 
the country into the most powerful Tai Kingdom in history. Economically, 
Bangkok probably replaced the Dutch base of Batavia to be the leading port of 
Southeast Asia at the end of ??th century; politically, Siam managed to extend 
its authority to the Laos to the north and to Kedah and Terengganu to the 
south in the same period ?Reid, ????: ???.  
 The third such area, the Malacca Strait, had long been the center of 
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Southeast Asian trade routes. The rise of Srivijaya in the ?th century coincided 
with the growing importance of maritime Silk Road. Located on the northern 
coast of Sumatra, Srivijaya was a powerful trading state able to attract a large 
number of ships to its ports. The country?s influence did not rely on territorial 
occupation, but on its control over strategic ports on the main trade routes. In 
order to secure the lucrative trade with China, Srivijaya started to send tributary 
missions to China as early as in the late ?th century. With the exception of the 
?th century, tributary missions continued into the ??th century ?Lieberman, 
????: ???; Wolters, ????, ?????. The close relations with China considerably 
strengthened Srivijaya?s position among its peers. Especially when private trade 
was banned prior to the Song dynasty, its ports offered the only way to trade 
with China. When Srivijaya lost its prominence around the end of the ??th 
century, Melaka rose quickly on the southern coast of Malay Peninsula. Initially 
a small port city, Melaka adopted a very similar strategy to seek close tributary 
relations with China. Not only were regular tributes submitted, the rulers of 
Melaka five times went to China to pay their homage ?Wang, ????b, Reid, 
????: ????. In ???? the country received the first inscription that the Ming 
Yong-le emperor ever addressed to the foreign rulers, an extraordinary honor 
in the eyes of neighboring states ?Stuart-Fox, ????: ???. When Zheng He?s 
grand fleets sailed across Southeast Asia in the early ??th century, they visited 
Melaka no less than ten times ?Lieberman, ????: ????. These exchanges 
significantly enhanced the reputation of Melaka as a China-favored trading 
port. It did not take long for Melaka to become the major trading center, where 
Southeast Asian goods gathered for sell in China and Chinese goods gathered 
for sell in Southeast Asia and beyond. 
３ ．Balancing Strategy III: Inviting External Arbitration and Protection
 Amid sub-regional anarchy, the China factor was carefully reckoned with 
by Southeast Asian countries. When it became necessary and urgent, some 
were willing to invite China to arbitrate in their disputes with other countries, 
and to protect themselves from the aggression of powerful neighbors ?Wolters, 
????: ??; Stuart-Fox, ?????. On some occasions China?s mighty presence 
in the regional hierarchy was enough to restore the sub-regional balance; on 
other occasions China had to issue explicit warnings to make certain countries 
comply with its opinions; on still other occasions the request for assistance 
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was carefully turned downed or quietly ignored. Though not always effective, 
China had played a non-negligible part in the sub-regional power balance of 
Southeast Asia.
 Mentioned earlier, the powerful trading state of Srivijaya had long 
benefited from the monopoly over maritime trade that it secured through 
close tributary relations with China. This monopoly, however, came to a steady 
decline after the ??th century because the Song Dynasty ????-????? gradually 
abolished the official ban on private trade ?Shiba, ????; Heng, ????: ???. 
Contrary to the expectation that Srivijaya would reduce its tributary missions to 
China, it actually sent more. The reason, as Wolters ?????: ??-??? argues, lied 
in the non-commercial interests of these missions. Srivijaya was under heavy 
attacks by the Javanese and Tamil armies between ??? and ????. The support 
from China was particularly important during this period. Indeed, Sirvijiyan 
missions to the Song court ?were never so numerous as during and after this 
troubled period? ???. Although the lack of historical records made it difficult 
to ascertain the actual exchanges between the two countries during these 
tributary missions, the maritime order in Southeast Asia was duly restored. 
Srivijaya not only survived the attacks but prospered well into the ??th century. 
 The China factor was also important for another maritime trading state: 
Melaka. In its rise to prominence in the first half of the ??th century, Melaka 
had to deal with the rapidly growing influence of Ayutthaya to the north and 
the declining but still powerful Javanese Empire of Majaphit to the south. 
Soon after its establishment, the city-state paid homage to both Ayutthaya 
and Majaphit in an attempt to win their support ?Lieberman, ????: ????. 
Nevertheless, it was not the final solution for the Melakan ruler. When the 
Ming envoy visited the country in ????, Melaka asked for full protection from 
China. In response, the Ming emperor Yong-le ordered the enfeoffment of its 
western hill and personally wrote an inscription for the occasion. The intention 
was to ensure Melaka that full protection would be provided as if the country 
were ?a tribute-paying province of China? Wang, ????: ???. Ayutthaya, 
itself a loyal tributary of China, was not happy. It even tried to confiscate the 
imperial seal that the Ming court had granted to Melaka. When Zheng He?s 
voyages visited Ayutthaya in ???? and ????, stark warnings were delivered?
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demanding Ayutthaya not to infringe the rights of Melaka ?Stuart-Fox, ????: 
??-???. 
 In mainland Southeast Asia, countries like Champa, Lan Xang, and 
Lan Na had all referred to China for assistance. In particular, Champa was 
keen to have China arbitrating in its conflict with Dai Viet. Dai Viet won 
independence from China in the ??th century ?Taylor, ?????. Soon after, the 
Song court was requested by Champa to provide arbitration in its conflict 
with Dai Viet ?Stuart-Fox, ????: ???. Instead of favoring one side over the 
other, China had been careful not to disturb the power balance between the 
two countries. When the conflict broke out again in the ????s, the Ming 
court five times appealed to the two sides to stop fighting ?Wang, ????: ????. 
Nevertheless, such appeals did not stop Champa from being fatally defeated by 
Dai Viet in ????.?? 
 In ???? Dai Viet launched the attack against another neighboring 
country? the Laotian Kingdom of Lan Xang, capturing its capital and killing 
its ruler. The Laotian envoys applied to China for assistance ?Stuart-Fox, 
????: ???. China responded with a strong worded warning against Dai Viet, 
demanding its withdrawal from Lan Xang. Similar warning was also sent 
to nearby tributary vassals against any assistance to Dai Viet. However, the 
Laotian request for Chinese forces was turned down. It was the Tai Kingdom 
of Lan Na that eventually offered military support to Lan Xang. Together, 
they drove Dai Viet out of the country. The Ming court promptly rewarded 
Lan Na for its action ?Wang, ????: ????. The sub-regional order was restored 
without the direct intervention of China. Indeed, on some occasions China 
was unable to offer meaningful assistance and the request for protection was 
quietly ignored. This was the case when Melaka requested imperial protection 
against the Portuguese in ????, and when the Burmese asked for assistance to 
save their Toungoo dynasty in ???? ?Stuart-Fox, ????: ???, ????. Yet, these 
unanswered requests show that amid intensified security threats from both 
within and without, there was ?a tendency among Southeast Asian rulers to 
appeal to China for help against enemies? Wolter, ????: ???.
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Ⅴ．Conclusion
 This article has examined the structural characteristics of international 
relations in pre-colonial Southeast Asia and the special roles that China had 
played at the sub-regional level. In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, most countries 
were willing to submit to the hierarchical order in East Asia by taking part 
in the China-centered tribute system. At the same time, these countries were 
involved in the fierce competition for survival and domination at the sub-
regional level. Taken together, international relations in pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia featured a complex political structure: regional hierarchy coexisting with 
sub-regional anarchy. 
 The anarchy-within-hierarchy structure, the article argues, had generated 
considerable impacts on the inter-state relations of Southeast Asia. While 
there was no clear sign of systemic balancing against China at the regional 
level, Southeast Asian countries carefully checked and maintained their power 
balance at the sub-regional level. In this structural context, the supremacy 
of China allowed it to play a crucial part in the sub-regional power balance. 
More specifically, there were three essential mechanisms through which the 
China factor became important in the international relations of Southeast Asia. 
First, the imperial recognition by China enhanced the legitimacy of individual 
Southeast Asian countries in a hierarchical regional order. Second, the tributary 
trade with China met the commercial interests of Southeast Asian trading 
states, and allowed these countries to consolidate their power amid intensified 
sub-regional competition. Third, China?s arbitration and protection were often 
sought by Southeast Asian states to defend themselves against the threat of 
neighboring powers. Notably, all these took place even during the periods when 
China was not actively seeking a dominant role in Southeast Asia. 
 Theoretically, the article has challenged the widely held structural realist 
view that international relations are either characterized by the balance of power 
in an anarchic system or dominated by a single superpower in a hierarchical 
system ?Waltz, ????; Walt, ????; Clark, ????; Lake, ?????. It argues that 
a complex structure of hierarchy-anarchy coexistence is empirically viable and 
theoretically important. If the Cold War resembled a ?hierarchy under anarchy? 
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order ?Wendt and Friedheim, ?????, pre-colonial Southeast Asia under 
the China-centered tribute system had been an ?anarchy within hierarchy? 
system. The article has made an attempt to juxtapose the theories of balance-
of-power and hierarchical relations to account for the complicated dynamics 
of international relations in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. Throughout the pre-
colonial era Southeast Asian countries engaged in the fierce competition for 
state survival and sub-regional domination. Most of them also sent regular 
tributary missions to China. The simultaneous balancing and bandwagoning 
was a clear sign of hierarchy-anarchy coexistence at the time. Meanwhile, 
though China had long been a ?detached? superpower in pre-colonial Southeast 
Asia, its impact on the sub-regional power balance was substantial and 
profound. A structuralist model of anarchy-with-hierarchy makes it possible to 
trace the distinctive roles that China had played at the sub-regional level. 
 A better understanding of China?s roles in pre-colonial Southeast Asia 
also sheds light on the current debate about the future of East Asia. As China 
rose quickly in economic and political terms in the past decades, the future 
of East Asia has been increasingly considered as a choice between balancing 
against the growing Chinese influences and bandwagoning with the rise 
of China ?Friedberg, ????; Kang, ????a, Acharya, ?????. The history of 
Southeast Asia?s engagement with China indicates that neither balancing nor 
bandwagoning is sufficient to guide the future of East Asia. Like pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia, international relations in East Asia after the Cold War have 
been characterized by simultaneous sub-system-level ?regional? anarchy and 
system-level ?global? hierarchy. Despite its rapid rise, China has not yet been 
able to play a dominant role in East Asia. The norms of respecting sovereignty 
and non-interference, to which China and ASEAN countries adamantly 
subscribes, provide few normative bases to re-build a regional hierarchy. Instead, 
inter-state relations in East Asia have shown many signs of regional anarchy 
such as the balance of influences between China and Japan, the competition 
for export between Japan and South Korea, and the institutional balancing 
dynamics centered on ASEAN ?He, ?????. The hierarchical relations in East 
Asia, if any, almost always point to the US? the only global superpower in the 
post-Cold War era. Like China in the pre-colonial era, the US has dominated 
the region not only in cultural, economic and political terms, but also through 
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its unmatched military capacity. The supremacy of the US has been far beyond 
the widely recognized dollar hegemony in East Asia. Just as pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia paid tributes to imperial China, East Asian countries, China 
included, all prefer to maintain a cordial relationship with the US. Under this 
anarchy-within-hierarchy structure, it is perhaps not surprising that ?i? the 
recognition by the US, in the form of normalized diplomatic relations, has 
been eagerly sought even by North Korea and Myanmar; ?ii? the access to the 
US market has shaped the commercial interests and economic competition 
of East Asian trading states; ?iii? East Asian countries have not been shy of 
seeking the US arbitration and protection in their inter-state disputes. As it is 
often said, ?history never repeats itself but it rhymes?. If the experiences of pre-
colonial Southeast Asia are of some guide to the future, it probably points to 
the structural impacts of the intricate link between the US unipolarity and the 
complex balancing dynamics in today?s East Asia.
?????????
? This is the first of the two related articles that explore the pre-colonial relations 
between Southeast Asia and China. This article focuses on the strategic reactions of 
pre-colonial Southeast Asia to the China-dominated regional hierarchy, and the other 
article ?Shu, ????? examines China?s hegemonic impacts on the sub-regional stability 
of Southeast Asia. The author wishes to thank Paul Bacon, Hiro Katsumata, Haolan 
Zheng, and the anonymous reviewer?s helpful suggestions and comments. 
? According to Wohlforth et al. ?????: ????, hierarchical relations may vary ?from various 
stages of system hegemony and suzerainty to rare instances of universal empire?. 
? Lake?s ?????? empirical analysis shows that subordinate states spend significantly less 
on their own defense than non-subordinate states in a US-dominated security hierarchy 
between ???? and ????. 
? For example, Japan formed an alliance with Germany to balance against the US prior 
to the Pacific War under an anarchic structure of world politics. By contrast, during the 
Cold War as the West formed an initially ideological and late political and economic 
hierarchy, Japan became a subordinate state under the dominance of the US. Apparently, 
neither cases can be used to disconfirm the theories of balance-of-power or hierarchical 
relations. 
? For instance, China was divided between the Jin Dynasty and the Southern Song 
Dynasty for nearly one and a half centuries ?????-?????. During this period, the Korean 
kingdom of Koryo paid tributes to both royal courts. Meanwhile, the weakened Sothern 
Song lost almost all the tributary contact with Southeast Asia ?Wang, ????a: ???. 
? Kowtow refers to the gesture of deep respect that one kneels and bows so low that his/
her head touches the ground. This tributary ritual met a famous refusal in ????. On 
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that occasion Lord Macartney was sent by the British government to demand trade 
concessions from China. He refused to perform kowtow in front of the Qian-long 
emperor in the belief that such behavior would indicate that Britain was inferior to China. 
? China also sent its own tributary mission to other countries when it was weak ?see 
Rossabi, ?????. A notable example is the Southern Song court that paid regular tributes 
to the Jin. 
? It should be noted that the tribute system operated under the Yuan dynasty followed a 
very different pattern. The Mongols requested the tributary rulers to ??? seek imperial 
audience personally, ??? send their sons as hostages, ??? conduct a census of their 
population, ??? provide military covée, ??? pay tax, and ??? allow a Mongol governor 
to be in charge ?Wang, ????a: ???. Such a sharp departure from the traditional Chinese 
understandings of its tributary authority had never been repeated in the late history of 
imperial China. 
? China has stipulated detailed rules on how to bury and honor a foreign envoy died on the 
tributary mission ?Fairbank, ????: ???-????. The Bruneian King was eventually buried 
in China. His lavish tomb is still located in Nanjing today. 
?? China did not intervene in the conflict between Dai Viet and Champa in ????. The 
reason probably lies in the fact that China?s occupation of Dai Viet between ???? and 
???? ended in a humiliating withdrawal. Dai Viet seemed to believe that the Ming court 
would not attempt another invasion to punish its campaign against Champa ?Wang, 
????: ????. 
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